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A Metasemantic Analysis of Gödel’s
Slingshot-Argument
Hans-Peter Leeb
Abstract. Gödel’s slingshot-argument proceeds from a referential theory of definite
descriptions and from the principle of compositionality for reference. It outlines
a metasemantic proof of Frege’s thesis that all true sentences refer to the same
object—as well as all false ones. Whereas Frege drew from this the conclusion
that sentences refer to truth-values, Gödel rejected a referential theory of definite
descriptions. By formalising Gödel’s argument, it is possible to reconstruct all
premises that are needed for the derivation of Frege’s thesis. For this purpose,
a reference-theoretical semantics for a language of first-order predicate logic with
identity and referentially treated definite descriptions will be defined. Some of
the premises of Gödel’s argument will be proven by such a reference-theoretical
semantics, whereas others can only be postulated. For example, the principle
that logically equivalent sentences refer to the same object cannot be proven but
must be assumed in order to derive Frege’s thesis. However, different true (or false)
sentences can refer to different states of affairs if the latter principle is rejected and
the other two premises are maintained. This is shown using an identity criterion
for states of affairs according to which two states of affairs are identical if and
only if they involve the same objects and have the same necessary and sufficient
condition for obtaining.
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Gödel puts forth his slingshot-argument as a metasemantic argument in
the following passage:
“What do the so-called descriptive phrases (i.e., phrases as, e.g. ‘the
author of Waverley ’ or ‘the king of England’) denote or signify and
what is the meaning [i.e. denotation] of sentences in which they occur?
The apparently obvious answer that, e.g., ‘the author of Waverley ’
signifies [i.e. denotes] Walter Scott, leads to unexpected difficulties.
For, if we admit the further apparently obvious axiom, that the signi-
fication of a composite expression, containing constituents which have
themselves a signification, depends only on the signification of these
constituents [...], then it follows that the sentence ‘Scott is the au-
thor of Waverley ’ signifies the same thing as ‘Scott is Scott’; and this
again leads almost inevitably to the conclusion [(FCG)] that all true
sentences have the same signification (as well as all false ones). Frege
actually drew this conclusion; [...] ‘the True’ being the name he uses
for the common signification [i.e. denotation] of all true propositions
[i.e. sentences].”1
He reacts to this argument as follows:
“But different true sentences may indicate [i.e. denote] different things.
Therefore this view concerning sentences makes it necessary either to
drop the above-mentioned principle [(R)] about the signification [...]
of composite expressions or to deny that [(A)] a descriptive phrase
denotes the object described.”2
In order to standardise the terminology of these various semantic notions,
the notion of reference will be used in this paper to replace Gödel’s notions
of denotation, signification, and description, as well as Frege’s notion of
meaning3 and Russell’s notion of indication. Thus, Gödel explicitly puts
forth the following theses as premises of his argument:
(A) Definite descriptions without free individual variables refer to individ-
uals as do individual constants (i.e. the fundamental assumption of a
referential theory of definite descriptions).
1 Cf. (Gödel 1944, p.450). This argument is discussed, e.g. in (Neale 1995 and 2001).
2 Cf. (Gödel 1944, p.451).
3 Cf. (Frege 1892).
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(R) The referent of a composite expression containing constituents which
have themselves a referent depends only on the referent of these con-
stituents (i.e. the principle of compositionality for referents). In
other words, it is always possible to substitute coreferential expres-
sions for each other within a composite expression without changing
the referent of this composite expression.
Gödel claims that from (A) and (R), it follows that
(FCG) all true sentences have the same referent—as well as all false ones
(i.e. the Frege-Church-Gödel thesis).
Gödel mentions that from (FCG), Frege drew the conclusion that
(T) truth-values are the referents of sentences (i.e. Frege’s answer as to
what the referents of sentences are).
By contrast, Gödel considers (FCG) to be absurd because different true
sentences may refer to different objects.
In this paper, Gödel’s slingshot-argument4 will be formalised in the
logical framework of first-order predicate logic with identity (hereinafter
abbreviated to PL1=)5. The aim of formalising Gödel’s argument is to ob-
tain from this formalisation all premises that are necessary for deriving
(FCG) from these very premises. Observe that Gödel’s argument is based
on a language for first-order predicate logic with identity and definite de-
scriptions (hereinafter abbreviated to L PL1
=ι) where definite descriptions
are treated referentially, that is, as referring to individuals.
How could these properties of truth and falsity of sentences (that is,
their being true and being false) be defined by means of the concepts and
methods of a semantics for such a language in order to formalise Gödel’s
argument? To investigate this question, consider the relation “x has y as
semantic value”. This relation can either be understood as the relation “ x
refers to y ” or as the relation “x has y as extension”. The truth or falsity
of a sentence can be defined by assigning a unique truth-value (True or
False) to the sentence as its semantic value. This semantic value is either
the referent or the extension of the sentence. On the other hand, the truth
4 Cf. (Gödel 1944).
5 Cf. (Kalish/Montague/Mar 21980).
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or falsity of a sentence can also be defined without assigning a semantic
value to the sentence.
Consider, for instance, the language of a propositional logic with atomic
sentences (hereinafter abbreviated to L ALA). The atomic sentences of such
a language are of the form pFa1. . . anq where F is an n-ary predicate constant
and a1, . . . , an are individual constants. Suppose individual constants have
individuals and n-ary predicate constants have sets of ordered n-tuples of
individuals as their semantic values. Suppose further the relation “x has
y as semantic value” is taken to be left-total and right-unique, i.e. it is
construed as the function “the semantic value of x is y ”. Then the question
is: How could the properties of truth and falsity of all sentences of L ALA
be defined in order to formalise Gödel’s argument? In logical semantics,
this can be done in two different ways:
(V1) No semantic values are assigned to sentences.
(V2) Semantic values are assigned to sentences.
In (V2), one can distinguish between two cases, depending on the type of
the assigned values:
(V2a) The semantic values of sentences are referents.
(V2b) The semantic values of sentences are extensions.
ad (V1) According to this answer, an atomic sentence of L ALA of the
form pFa1. . . anq is true iff the ordered n-tuple of the semantic values of
a1, . . . , an is an element of the set that is the semantic value of F. Further-
more, a sentence of the form p¬S q is true iff S is not true (i.e. false), and
a sentence of the form p(S 1 ∧ S 2)q is true iff S 1 and S 2 are true, and so on
for the remaining connectives.
By this recursive procedure, the truth and falsity of all atomic sentences
of L ALA can be defined depending only on their form and on the seman-
tic values of the descriptive constants of which these atomic sentences are
composed. In (V1), it is only the descriptive constants that have unique
semantic values. The x-position of the function “the semantic value of x is
y ” is therefore restricted to individual constants and n-ary predicate con-
stants. Using common semantic clauses for the connectives, the truth and
falsity of all sentences composed of such atomic sentences can be defined
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depending only on the form of these sentences and on the truth and falsity
of the atomic sentences which are contained in those sentences.
ad (V2) According to this answer, an atomic sentence of L ALA of the
form pFa1. . . anq is true iff the semantic value of pFa1. . . anq is the truth-value
1. The semantic value of pFa1. . . anq is the truth-value 1 iff the ordered n-
tuple of the semantic values of a1, . . . , an is an element of the set that is
the semantic value of F. Furthermore, the semantic value of a sentence of
the form p¬S q is the truth-value 1 iff the semantic value of S is not the
truth-value 1 (i.e. the semantic value of S is the truth-value 0), and the
semantic value of a sentence of the form p(S 1 ∧ S 2)q is the truth-value 1 iff
the semantic values of S 1 and S 2 are the truth-value 1, and so on for the
remaining connectives.
By this recursive procedure, the function “the semantic value of x is y ”,
which in (V1) was yet limited to individual constants and n-ary predicate
constants, is now extended to all sentences of L ALA. Thus, the function
“the semantic value of x is the truth-value y ” (where y ∈ {1, 0}) is defined
for all atomic sentences, depending only on their form and on the semantic
values of the descriptive constants of which these atomic sentences are com-
posed. Using common semantic clauses for the connectives, this function
can be uniquely extended from atomic sentences to all sentences composed
of atomic sentences. Once this function has been defined for all sentences,
the truth or falsity of a sentence S of L ALA can be defined in the following
way: S is true iff the semantic value of S is the truth-value 1 (or: S is false
iff the semantic value of S is the truth-value 0).
In the case of true singular sentences, Gödel’s argument proceeds from
an assumption for Conditional Proof which states that two singular sen-
tences σ1 and σ2 are true. These singular sentences contain at least one
individual constant. On the basis of this assumption for CP (and his other
assumptions, such as the one that reference is a function), he aims to prove
that σ1 and σ2 refer to the same object. However, he provides no answer as
to how the truth or falsity of a sentence—let alone of a singular sentence—
ought to be defined. Were he to define it as stated in (V2a), any further
assumptions than his assumption for Conditional Proof and the assump-
tion that reference is a function would be wholly superfluous. For in (V2a),
from the mere fact that σ1 and σ2 are true, it follows by symmetry and
transitivity of identity that σ1 and σ2 refer to the same object.
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Proof:
1. σ1 is true Ass. f. CP
2. σ1 is true ⇔
the truth-value that σ1 refers to = 1
(V2a)
3. the truth-value that σ1 refers to = 1 BMP 1–2
4. σ2 is true Ass. f. CP
5. σ2 is true ⇔
the truth-value that σ2 refers to = 1
(V2a)
6. the truth-value that σ2 refers to = 1 BMP 4–5
7. the truth-value that σ1 refers to =
the truth-value that σ2 refers to
Identity 3, 6
8. σ1 and σ2 refer to the same truth-value 7 6
Hence, if one proceeds according to (V2a), no further premises than the
assumption for Conditional Proof and the provision of a reference function
are needed.
Following Gödel’s argument, the question of how the truth or falsity of
a sentence ought to be defined should not be answered in the same way as
in (V2a) (or (V2b)), lest his argument become trivial. In what follows, we
shall take particular account of this point.
6 If two sentences refer to identical truth-values, then they refer to the same truth-value.
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2 Reference-Theoretical Models
In order to formalise Gödel’s slingshot-argument, a language of first-order
predicate logic with identity and with a definite description operator (i.e.
L PL1
=ι) is required as the object language. Furthermore, a semantics for
such a language is required. In what follows, the language L PL1
=ι will
be defined, and the reference-theoretical models for it and the reference-
theoretical clauses associated with it will be specified.
Let the alphabet of L PL1
=ι contain a countably infinite amount of in-
dividual constants and n-ary predicate constants (n ≥ 1) as its descriptive
(that is, non-logical) signs. Let it further contain as its logical signs a
countably infinite amount of individual variables as well as the all quanti-
fier ‘/\’, the existential quantifier ‘\/’, the definite description operator ‘ι’,
the usual connectives ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, ‘↔’, and the sign for identity ‘=’.
Finally, let it contain as its auxiliary signs the left and right parentheses
‘(’, ‘)’.
In what follows, a simultaneous-recursive definition of the formulas and
singular terms of L PL1
=ι is given7:
(D1) The formulas and singular terms of L PL1
=ι
(simultaneous-recursive definition):
a. c is an individual constant ⇒
c is a singular term
b. v is an individual variable ⇒
v is a singular term
c. v is an individual variable & φ is a formula ⇒
pιvφq is a singular term
d. t1, t2 are singular terms ⇒
pt1 = t2q is a formula
e. F is an n-ary predicate constant &
t1, . . . , tn are singular terms ⇒
pFt1. . . tnq is a formula
f. φ, ψ are formulas ⇒
p¬φq, p(φ ∧ ψ)q, p(φ ∨ ψ)q, p(φ→ ψ)q, p(φ↔ ψ)q are formulas
7 Cf. (Gamut 1991, pp.159 f.) and (Kalish/Montague/Mar 21980, pp.308 f.).
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g. v is an individual variable & φ is a formula ⇒
p( /\v)φq, p(\/v)φq are formulas
h. Nothing else is a formula or a singular term of L PL1
=ι
The sentences of L PL1
=ι are those formulas in which no individual vari-
able occurs free (these are the closed formulas). Furthermore, we write for
the set of individual constants ‘ICL PL1= ι’, for the set of individual variables
‘IVL PL1= ι ’, for the set of definite descriptions ‘DDL PL1= ι’, for the set of sin-
gular terms ‘STL PL1= ι’, for the set of n-ary predicate constants ‘PCL PL1= ι’,
and finally for the set of all formulas ‘FML PL1= ι’. Thus, it holds, by (D1),
for the set of singular terms that
(1) STL PL1= ι = ICL PL1= ι ∪ IVL PL1= ι ∪ DDL PL1= ι.
Subsequently, we define the expressions of L PL1
=ι that are capable of
referring in the proper and improper sense:
(D2) x is an expression of L PL1
=ι capable of referring :⇔
x ∈ STL PL1= ι g x ∈ PCL PL1= ι g x ∈ FML PL1= ι
(D3) x is an expression of L PL1
=ι capable of referring in the proper sense
:⇔ x is an expression of L PL1
=ι capable of referring &
∼(∃v) (v ∈ IVL PL1= ι & v occurs free in x)
(D4) x is an expression of L PL1=ι capable of referring in the improper sense
:⇔ x is an expression of L PL1
=ι capable of referring &
(∃v) (v ∈ IVL PL1= ι & v occurs free in x)
In the following definition, the expression ‘x is a primitive expression capa-
ble of referring in the proper sense of L PL1
=ι’ is formalised as ‘PRfEp (x,L PL1
=ι)’:
(D5) PRfEp (x,L PL1
=ι) :⇔ x ∈ ICL PL1= ι g x ∈ PCL PL1= ι.
In a model-theoretical semantics, a domain D can be understood as
a set of individuals. Subsequently, it is possible to define what an entity
relative to such a domain is. In so doing, the expression ‘y is an entity
relative to D’ is formalised as ‘Ent (y,D)’, and the sign ‘∅’ stands for the
empty set:
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(D6) Let D be a set of individuals.
Ent (y,D) :⇔ D , ∅ & y ∈ D ∪ (Dn)
In (D5) and (D6), the two relata-sets for a reference function for the
descriptive constants—the primitive expressions capable of referring in the
proper sense—were defined. The elements of the power set  of Dn are
considered to be the referents of n-ary predicate constants.
In what follows, a reference function ref for L PL1
=ι which is only defined
for descriptive constants is introduced:
(D7) Let X and Y be sets, and let D be a non-empty set of individuals.
ref is a reference function from X to Y for L PL1
=ι relative to D :⇔
ref is a reference relation with the relata-sets X and Y for L PL1
=ι
relative to D—that is, X ⊆ {x |PRfEp (x,L PL1
=ι)} &
Y ⊆ {y |Ent (y,D)} & ref ⊆ X × Y—&
(∀x) (x ∈ X ⇒ (∃!y) (y ∈ Y & 〈x, y〉 ∈ ref )) &
(∀x) (x ∈ X & x ∈ ICL PL1= ι ⇒ ref (x) ∈ D) &
(∀x) (x ∈ X & x ∈ PCL PL1= ι ⇒ ref (x) ∈ (Dn))
Hence, the referents of an individual constant and of an n-ary predicate
constant relative to ref are an individual from the domain and a set of
ordered n-tuples of such individuals, respectively.
It is not reference functions but variable assignments that are respon-
sible for interpreting individual variables of L PL1
=ι. In what follows, a
variable assignment and its [v|d]-variants are defined:
(D8) Let D be a non-empty set of individuals.
g is a variable assignment from IVL PL1= ι to D :⇔
g is a function from IVL PL1= ι to D
(D9) Let g be a variable assignment from IVL PL1= ι to D, and let v ∈ IVL PL1= ι
and d ∈ D.
g′ is a [v|d]-variant of g :⇔
g′ = g[v|d] & g[v|d] = (g \ {〈v, g(v)〉}) ∪ {〈v, d〉}
A [v |d ]-variant of g is a function g′ which differs from g at most in the
value d it assigns to v (and therefore, it assigns to any other argument
than v the same value as g). Thus, the number of [v | d ]-variants of a
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variable assignment is equal to the number of individuals of the domain.
Any [v|d]-variant of a variable assignment is in itself a variable assignment
from IVL PL1= ι to D. Furthermore, for any v ∈ IVL PL1= ι and any d ∈ D:
g[v | d ](v) = d. These variable assignments and their [v | d ]-variants are
necessary for interpreting open formulas, quantified formulas, and definite
descriptions of L PL1
=ι.
The definition of a reference-theoretical model for L PL1
=ι is as follows:
(D10) A reference-theoretical model M for L PL1
=ι is a triple 〈D, ref , d◦〉,
such that
D is a set of individuals &
(∃X,Y) (ref is a reference function from X to Y for
L PL1
=ι relative to D) &
d◦ ∈ D is the designated nil-individual8
A reference-theoretical model of this form has to be supplemented with its
associated recursive clauses. In what follows, such clauses will be framed
according to (V2a) and (V1). From this, two alternative semantics for
L PL1
=ι arise, based on the method of using the designated nil-individual.9
The formalisation of Gödel’s slingshot-argument, however, will not be based
on the first but on the second semantics (though the first one will later be
used for the purpose of comparison).
2.1 Reference-Theoretical Clauses According to (V2a)
The reference function ref of a reference-theoretical model M for L PL1
=ι
is only defined for descriptive constants. By means of a simultaneous-
recursive definition, this reference function ref is extended to a reference
function refM,g for all expressions of L PL1
=ι capable of referring. In the
course of such a simultaneous-recursive definition of an extension refM,g of
ref , the same entities that the reference function ref had previously assigned
to the descriptive constants of L PL1
=ι are now assigned to them as their
referents relative to refM,g.
8 Owing to the third condition, D is non-empty, which is why this addition can be
omitted from the first condition.
9 Cf. method IIIb in (Carnap 21956, §8, pp.35 ff.).
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Let t1, . . . , tn ∈ STL PL1= ι , let further F ∈ PCL PL1= ι and φ, ψ ∈ FML PL1= ι,
and let v ∈ IVL PL1= ι .
(D11) Let M = 〈D, ref , d◦〉 be a reference-theoretical model for L PL1
=ι,
let g be a variable assignment from IVL PL1= ι to D, and
let g[v|d] be a [v|d]-variant of g.
a. t ∈ ICL PL1= ι ⇒ refM,g (t) B ref (t)
b. t ∈ IVL PL1= ι ⇒ refM,g (t) B g (t)
c. refM,g (F) B ref (F)
Thus, the referent of a descriptive constant relative to refM,g is exactly that
entity relative to D that the reference function ref of M had previously
assigned to it. Similarly, the referent of an individual variable relative to
refM,g is exactly that entity relative to D that the variable assignment g had
previously assigned to it.
Subsequently, the referent of a definite description of L PL1
=ι relative to
refM,g is defined as follows10:
(D11) (Continues (D11))
d. (∃!d) (d ∈ D & refM,g[v|d] (φ) = 1 & d = e) ⇒
refM,g (pιvφq) = e
otherwise refM,g (pιvφq) = d◦
Therefore, the referent of a definite description relative to refM,g is of the
same kind as the referent of an individual constant, namely an individual
d in D. If there is a unique individual d in D such that refM,g[v|d] (φ) = 1 and
d = e, then e is the referent of a definite description pιvφq relative to refM,g.
If there is no such unique individual, then the referent relative to refM,g is
the designated nil-individual d◦.
Subsequently, the referent of all formulas of L PL1
=ι relative to refM,g can
be defined as follows:
10 Cf. (Scott 1967, p.32) and (Gamut 1991, p.161).
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(D11) (Continues (D11))
e. refM,g (pFt1. . . tnq) = 1⇔
〈refM,g (t1), . . . , refM,g (tn)〉 ∈ refM,g (F)11
f. refM,g (pt1 = t2q) = 1⇔ refM,g (t1) = refM,g (t2)
g. refM,g (p¬φq) = 1⇔ refM,g (φ) = 0
h. refM,g (p(φ ∧ ψ)q) = 1⇔ refM,g (φ) = refM,g (ψ) = 1
i. refM,g (p(φ ∨ ψ)q) = 1⇔ refM,g (φ) = 1 g refM,g (ψ) = 1
j. refM,g (p(φ→ ψ)q) = 1⇔ refM,g (φ) = 0 g refM,g (ψ) = 1
k. refM,g (p(φ↔ ψ)q) = 1⇔ refM,g (φ) = refM,g (ψ)
l. refM,g (p( /\v)φq) = 1⇔ (∀d) (d ∈ D ⇒ refM,g[v|d] (φ) = 1)
m. refM,g (p(\/v)φq) = 1⇔ (∃d) (d ∈ D & refM,g[v|d] (φ) = 1)
This completes the simultaneous-recursive definition of an extension refM,g
of ref to all expressions of L PL1
=ι capable of referring.
Furthermore, a concept of relativised truth based on a reference function
refM,g can be introduced as follows, where ‘x is true relative to refM,g’ is
formalised as ‘True (x, refM,g)’:
(D12) Let x be a formula of L PL1
=ι, let further M = 〈D, ref , d◦〉 be a
reference-theoretical model for L PL1
=ι, and let g be a variable as-
signment from IVL PL1= ι to D.
True (x, refM,g) :⇔ refM,g (x) = 1
This first semantics for L PL1
=ι based on the method of using the designated
nil-individual was developed according to (V2a). The next step would be
to define additional semantic notions such as the notions of logical truth
and of logical equivalence. However, we will not pursue this course any
further, as this would lead to the trivialisation of Gödel’s argument. For
from the mere assumption that two sentences are true relative to refM,g, it
follows by (D11) and (D12) that they refer to the same object. Instead,
these semantic notions will be defined according to (V1).
11 For any d ∈ D, the standard convention applies: 〈d〉 = d.
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2.2 Reference-Theoretical Clauses According to (V1)
In what follows, a semantics for L PL1
=ι will be presented which, though
based on the method of using the designated nil-individual, will yet be
developed according to (V1). For this purpose, a reference function ref
will be introduced that will only be defined for the descriptive constants.
Thus, the semantic values of descriptive constants will be considered as
referents. Furthermore, the truth and falsity of all formulas (and thus
of all sentences) of L PL1
=ι will be defined in the form of a simultaneous-
recursive definition—without assigning any referents relative to refM,g to
these formulas. In so doing, the aforementioned trivialisation of Gödel’s
argument can be avoided because the question of what the referents of
sentences are is left open for the time being.
Let t1, . . . , tn ∈ STL PL1= ι , let further F ∈ PCL PL1= ι and φ, ψ ∈ FML PL1= ι,
and let v ∈ IVL PL1= ι .
(D13) Let M = 〈D, ref , d◦〉 be a reference-theoretical model for L PL1
=ι,
let further g be a variable assignment from IVL PL1= ι to D, and
let g[v|d] be a [v|d]-variant of g.
a. t ∈ ICL PL1= ι ⇒ refM,g (t) B ref (t)
b. t ∈ IVL PL1= ι ⇒ refM,g (t) B g (t)
c. refM,g (F) B ref (F)
d. (∃!d) (d ∈ D & True (φ, refM,g[v|d]) & d = e) ⇒
refM,g (pιvφq) = e
otherwise refM,g (pιvφq) = d◦
e. True (pFt1. . . tnq, refM,g)⇔
〈refM,g (t1), . . . , refM,g (tn)〉 ∈ refM,g (F)
f. True (pt1 = t2q, refM,g)⇔ refM,g (t1) = refM,g (t2)
g. True (p¬φq, refM,g)⇔ ∼True (φ, refM,g)
(i.e. False (φ, refM,g))
h. True (p(φ ∧ ψ)q, refM,g)⇔ True (φ, refM,g) & True (ψ, refM,g)
i. True (p(φ ∨ ψ)q, refM,g)⇔ True (φ, refM,g) g True (ψ, refM,g)
j. True (p(φ→ ψ)q, refM,g)⇔ False (φ, refM,g) g True (ψ, refM,g)
k. True (p(φ↔ ψ)q, refM,g)⇔
(True (φ, refM,g) & True (ψ, refM,g)) g
(False (φ, refM,g) & False (ψ, refM,g))
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l. True (p( /\v)φq, refM,g)⇔ (∀d) (d ∈ D⇒ True (φ, refM,g[v|d]))
m. True (p(\/v)φq, refM,g)⇔ (∃d) (d ∈ D & True (φ, refM,g[v|d]))
The fundamental assumption of a referential theory of definite de-
scriptions for a formal language, i.e. the assumption that
(A) definite descriptions without free individual variables refer to individ-
uals as do individual constants,
has promptly been adopted into clause (D13d). Since definite descriptions
are—according to (D1c)—singular terms, (A) is not only included in clause
(D13d) but also in clauses (D13e) and (D13f). This is owing to the fact
that these three clauses directly concern singular terms and, thus, definite
descriptions. For if in (D13e) and (D13f), the metalinguistic variable t1
stands for a definite description, then refM,g (t1) is defined precisely because
of clause (D13d). In his argument, Gödel aims at disproving (A); in other
words, he seeks to show that (A)—together with further assumptions—
entails absurd consequences, i.e. (FCG). He considers (FCG) to be absurd
because different true sentences can refer to different objects (and different
false sentences can refer to different objects as well). Thus, his argument
is a case of reductio-ad-absurdum. To formalise Gödel’s argument, I have
therefore opted for a semantics for L PL1
=ι that is grounded in (A).
Based on such a concept of relativised truth, the semantic notions of log-
ical truth (formal: ‘LTrue (x)’), of logical equivalence (formal: ‘LE (x1, x2)’),
and of satisfiability (formal: ‘Satisfiable (x)’) can be defined as follows:
(D14) Let x be a formula of L PL1
=ι.
LTrue (x) :⇔ (∀M, g) True (x, refM,g)
(D15) Let x1 and x2 be formulas of L PL1
=ι.
LE (x1, x2) :⇔ LTrue (px1 ↔ x2q)12
(D16) Let x be a formula of L PL1
=ι.
Satisfiable (x) :⇔ (∃M, g) True (x, refM,g)
12 This paper follows the usage in which the outermost pair of parentheses in a formula
can be omitted.
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This second semantics for L PL1
=ι based on the method of using the desig-
nated nil-individual is developed according to (V1) and shall serve as the
foundation for the formalisation of Gödel’s slingshot-argument.
Let A1 and A2 be expressions of L PL1
=ι capable of referring. Then, the
relation of coreferentiality can be defined as follows:
(D17) A1 ≡refM,g A2 :⇔ refM,g (A1) = refM,g (A2)
Owing to the fact that identity is an equivalence relation, the relation ≡refM,g
is—according to the definition above—an equivalence relation as well, i.e.
a relation that is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. Thus, it holds that
(Rf) (∀A1) A1 ≡refM,g A1
(Sy) (∀A1, A2) (A1 ≡refM,g A2 ⇒ A2 ≡refM,g A1)
(Tr) (∀A1, A2, A3) (A1 ≡refM,g A2 & A2 ≡refM,g A3 ⇒ A1 ≡refM,g A3)
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3 Premises of Gödel’s Argument
The premises of Gödel’s argument can be divided into three categories.
There are
(i) premises that are provable using only the assumptions of the second
semantics, i.e. (D13) (these premises are the first two metatheorems
and the first lemma—see §3.1),
(ii) premises that are not provable using only the assumptions of the sec-
ond semantics and which therefore have to be postulated as valid (these
are the postulates and principles—see §3.2),
and
(iii) premises that are provable using the assumptions of the second se-
mantics and some of the postulates and principles from (ii) (these are
the second lemma and the fourth metatheorem—see §3.3).
3.1 Three Metatheorems and the First Lemma
Singular sentences contain at least one individual constant. Let σ be a
singular sentence, and let c be an individual constant that occurs in σ.
Then, this singular sentence is written as ‘σ[c]’. Now let σ[c] be a singular
sentence, and let v be an individual variable that does not occur in σ[c].
Replacing all occurrences of c in σ[c] with v results in a formula that is
written as ‘σ[c/v]’.
The following premises are provable using only the second semantics;
in their proofs, there is no need for any principles and postulates of (ii)
above. In what follows, two metatheorems concerning singular sentences
will be proven. These will come in useful for the formalisation of Gödel’s
slingshot-argument.
3.1.1 The first metatheorem: (T1)
Let M = 〈D, ref , d◦〉 be a reference-theoretical model for L PL1
=ι, let further
g be a variable assignment from IVL PL1= ι to D. Let σ be a singular sentence
of L PL1
=ι that contains an individual constant c of IVL PL1= ι , and let v be an
individual variable of L PL1
=ι that does not occur in σ[c]. Then, the first
metatheorem for such sentences states that
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(T1) {(D13), (D9)} |−PL1=
(∀σ, c, v,M, g)
(True (σ[c], refM,g)⇒ True (pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g)).
The proof of (T1) can be found in the appendix. By way of illustration,
consider an example in everyday language: if the sentence ‘Salzburg is a
city’ is true, then the sentence ‘Salzburg is the thing such that it is a city
and identical to Salzburg’ must be true as well.
3.1.2 Formal equivalent of the fundamental assumption (A) of a
referential theory of definite descriptions: lemma (L1)
The first lemma is a formal equivalent of (A). It is therefore exactly that
metatheoretical sentence that Gödel wants to refute. Using (T1) together
with the reference-theoretical clause for identity (see (D13f)), we obtain
(L1) {(D13), (D17), (T1)} |−PL1=
(∀σ, c, v,M, g)
(True (σ[c], refM,g)⇒ c ≡refM,g pιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q).
Proof: Lemma (L1) follows from (D13f), (D17), and (T1). 
By way of illustration, consider yet again an example in everyday lan-
guage: if the sentence ‘Salzburg is a city’ holds, then the proper noun
‘Salzburg’ and the definite description ‘the thing such that it is a city and
identical to Salzburg’ refer to the same object.
This lemma will facilitate the formalisation of Gödel’s argument. It
states that if the singular sentence σ[c] is true, then the individual constant
c refers to the same object as the definite description pιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q,
viz. an individual. Since v is an individual variable that does not occur
in σ[c], pιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q contains no free individual variables. To
put it simply, (L1) states that if a certain singular sentence holds, then a
certain individual constant refers to the same object as a certain definite
description without free individual variables. Lemma (L1) is therefore a
formal equivalent of (A). Consequently, Gödel aims to prove in his argu-
ment that not only (A) but also its formal equivalent, (L1), entail absurd
consequences. According to him, (L1) and thus (A) are to be abandoned.
Since (L1) is a metatheoretical sentence provable only on the basis of the
second semantics—a sentence that entails absurd consequences—Gödel’s
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argument is directed against any semantics, on the basis of which (L1) can
be proven.
3.1.3 The second metatheorem: (T2)
Theorem (T1) leads to the following metatheorem for singular sentences:
(T2) {(D13), (T1)} |−PL1=
(∀σ, c, v,M, g)
(True (σ[c], refM,g)⇒ True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g))
The proof of (T2) can be found in the appendix. Once again, consider an
example in everyday language: if the sentence ‘Salzburg is a city’ holds,
then so does the sentence ‘Salzburg is a city iff Salzburg is the thing such
that it is a city and identical to Salzburg’.
What follows is a corollary of (T2):
(Cr1) {(T2), (D14), PL1-theorem} |−PL1=
(∀σ, c, v) (LTrue (σ[c]) ⇒ LTrue (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q))
The proof can be found in the appendix, lines 3–9 of the proof of (L2).
3.1.4 The third metatheorem: (T3)
By (T2), a further metatheorem concerning singular sentences can be proven,
despite the fact that it is not needed for the formalisation of Gödel’s ar-
gument. However, it can—together with corollary (Cr1) of metatheorem
(T2)—be used to discuss an interesting point that is of no little importance
for this argument.
This further metatheorem is as follows:
(T3) {(D16), (T2), PL1-theorem} |−PL1=
(∀σ, c, v)
(Satisfiable (σ[c]) ⇒ Satisfiable (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q))
Proof: (T3) holds by (T2), (D16), and by the PL1-theorem ‘( /\x) (Fx →
Gx)→ ((\/x) (Fx)→ (\/x) (Gx))’. 
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Corollary (Cr1) of metatheorem (T2) shows that
(1) LTrue (σ[c])
is a sufficient condition for
(2) LTrue (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q)
and thus, by (D15), it is also a sufficient condition for
(3) LE (σ[c], pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q).
By (LR), i.e. the principle that logically equivalent sentences refer to the
same object, (3) gives
(4) σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q
if (1). Now, (T3) shows that
(5) Satisfiable (σ[c])
is a sufficient condition for
(6) Satisfiable (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q).
The question that will now be addressed is as to whether the assumption
that
(7) True (σ[c], refM,g),
from which it follows that (5), is sufficient for (2) and thus by (D15) also
sufficient for (3). If so, then it is possible to deduce from (3) by (LR) that
(4) if (7). In this case, Gödel could—if he assumes (LR)—abandon his
assumption (4) that σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q (for all σ, c, v,M, g)
holds unconditionally. This assumption of his cannot be proven in the
context of the second semantics (and neither can (LR)); instead, it has to
be postulated as valid.
However, it is possible to prove that (5) is not a sufficient condition for
(2). At a particular step in the process of formalising Gödel’s argument, it is
therefore not possible to forego Gödel’s additional assumption (4) (see (G)
in §3.2.4). This is the case because the following metatheoretical sentence
is false in the context of the second semantics and thus refutable (see the
proof of the refutability of (NT) in §6.3):
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(NT) (∀σ, c, v)
(Satisfiableσ[c] ⇒ LTrue (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q)
Using a singular sentence that does not contain the individual variable v,
such as the atomic (and thus singular) sentence pFcq, we prove that (NT)
is false by showing that
(INT) Satisfiable (pFcq) ⇒ LTrue (pFc↔ c = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q)
does not hold. For (INT) is an instantiation and thus a logical consequence
of (NT). However, if a logical consequence of (NT) is false, then so is (NT).

Therefore, assuming the satisfiability of pFcq is not sufficient for the
logical truth of pFc ↔ c = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q and thus not sufficient for
the logical equivalence of pFcq and pc = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q either. In other
words, the logical equivalence of two sentences is understood to mean that
the two sentences are both true (or false) relative to the same models and
variable assignments. It may be the case that the two sentences pFcq and
pc = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q are true relative to the same models and variable
assignments. But there remain models and variable assignments relative
to which pFcq is false, pc = ιv (Fv∧ v = c)q, however, is true (e.g. the model
used in (5) in the proof of the refutability of (NT)). Thus, the condition of
satisfiability of pFcq is to weak to allow the application of (LR) to both of
the sentences. Therefore, it is not possible to justify by (INT), (D15), and
by principle (LR) that pFcq and pc = ιv (Fv∧v = c)q refer to the same object
if pFcq is satisfiable. Nor is it possible to justify by (NT), (D15), and by
(LR) that it holds for all σ, c, v that σ[c] and pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q refer
to the same object if σ[c] is satisfiable.
Furthermore, assuming the logical truth of σ[c] is of no use to the
formalisation of Gödel’s argument, for Gödel does not aim to derive the
thesis that only all logically true singular sentences refer to the same object,
but rather the thesis that all true—and thus also all contingently true—
singular sentences do so.
3.1.5 A consequence of the reference-theoretical clause for nega-
tion: (N)
(N) {(D13)} |−PL1=
(∀σ, c,M, g) (False (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒ True (p¬σ[c]q, refM,g))
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3.2 Principles and Postulates
In order to avoid any trivialisation of Gödel’s argument, it is left open in
(D13) what the referents of sentences (and formulas) are. For this reason,
the definition of coreferentiality in (D17) is not applicable to sentences (and
formulas). Consequently, the following premises of Gödel’s argument are
not provable using only the second semantics. Therefore, the validity of the
principles contained in these premises has to be postulated on a metase-
mantic level, thus enabling them to guide the search for such referents
without any supposition as to what the referents of sentences are.
3.2.1 Specification of (R) for closed singular terms: (RT)
(RT) (∀S 1, S 2, t1, t2,M, g)
(Res (S 2, S 1(t1//t2)) & t1 ≡refM,g t2 ⇒ S 1 ≡refM,g S 2)
13
3.2.2 Specification of (R) for sentences: (RS)
(RS) (∀S 1, S 2,T1,T2,M, g)
(Res (S 2, S 1(T1//T2)) & T1 ≡refM,g T2 ⇒ S 1 ≡refM,g S 2)
3.2.3 Logically equivalent sentences refer to the same object: (LR)
(LR) (∀S 1, S 2,M, g) (LE (S 1, S 2) ⇒ S 1 ≡refM,g S 2)
Observe that in the second semantics, the principle (LR) is not provable
by means of the definitions of truth in (D13k) and of logical equivalence in
(D15): based on the logical truth of pS 1 ↔ S 2q alone, it is not possible to
draw any conclusions (by means of these definitions) as to the referents of
S 1 and S 2.
From the point of view of a state-of-affairs semantics, two logically
equivalent sentences (that are not identical) describe states of affairs which
involve different objects and have different necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for obtaining. Hence, those states of affairs are not identical, although
they are described by logically equivalent sentences.
13 ‘Res (S 2, S 1(A1//A2))’ abbreviates ‘S 2 is a result of substituting one ore more occur-
rences of A1 in S 1 with A2’.
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Carnap assumed the principle (LR) in his early semantics14, and Church
adopted it as a premise of his slingshot-argument15. The principle (LR) and
theorem (T2) enable us to take a certain step in the proof of Gödel’s argu-
ment. And yet, this principle was often criticised. Barwise and Perry, for
instance, rejected this principle as untenable in their critique of premises of
slingshot-arguments.16 The standard version of the slingshot-argument—
according to Barwise and Perry—states that the (FCG)-thesis (the assump-
tion that all true sentences refer to the same object, as do all false sentences)
can be derived from (LR) and (RT).
3.2.4 Gödel’s assertion: (G)
(G) (∀σ, c, v,M, g)
σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q
Observe that σ[c] and pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c))q are not logically equivalent
in the second semantics, as was demonstrated in §3.1.4.
The postulate (G) does not hold in a state-of-affairs semantics, for in-
stance because the state of affairs that the sentence ‘Scott is an author of
Waverley ’ refers to is different from the state of affairs that the sentence
‘Scott is the thing such that it is an author of Waverley and identical to
Scott’ refers to. The necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining of the
first state of affairs is the condition that Scott has the property of being
an author of Waverley. By contrast, the necessary and sufficient condition
for obtaining of the second state of affairs is the condition that Scott is
identical to the thing that is an author of Waverley and identical to Scott.
Since these two conditions are different, the two states of affairs that those
two sentences describe must be different as well.
14 Cf. (Carnap 1942).
15 Cf. (Church 1943).
16 Cf. (Barwise/Perry 1981, p.378).
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3.3 The Second Lemma and Fourth Metatheorem
The following premises are provable using the assumptions of the second
semantics and some of the postulates and principles from §3.2.
3.3.1 Logically true singular sentences refer to the same object as
certain identity sentences: lemma (L2)
The postulate (G) leads to a consequence that can be proven independently
of (G) itself. This consequence is lemma (L2).17 Using this lemma, the
first step in the proof of theorem (T4)—that is, the case of true singular
sentences—can be justified without any need for the postulate (G) itself.
This lemma, which can be proven by (LR), (T2), (D14), (D15), and by a
PL1-theorem is as follows:
(L2) {(D14), (D15), (T2), PL1-theorem, (LR)} |−PL1=
(∀σ, c, v,M, g) (LTrue (σ[c]) ⇒ σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q)
The proof of (L2) can be found in the appendix. Consider the following
example in everyday language: if the sentence ‘Salzburg is or is not a city’
is logically true, then the two sentences ‘Salzburg is or is not a city’ and
‘Salzburg is the thing such that it is (a city or not a city) and identical to
Salzburg’ refer to the same object.
3.3.2 The theorem for true singular sentences: (T4)
(T4) (∀σ1, σ2, a, b,M, g)
(True (σ1[a], refM,g) & True (σ2[b], refM,g) ⇒ σ1[a] ≡refM,g σ2[b])
This theorem will be proven in §4.1 by (L1), (L2), (RT), (G), and three
further premises. It serves as a premise for the case of false singular sen-
tences.
17 By the rules of first-order predicate logic, (L2) can be derived from (G), but not vice
versa; therefore, (G) is logically stronger than (L2). Observe that ‘( /\x) (Gx)→ ( /\x) (Fx→
Gx)’ is a PL1-theorem, while ‘( /\x) (Fx→ Gx)→ ( /\x) (Gx)’ is not.
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4 Formalisation of Gödel’s Argument
As stated previously, Gödel presupposes a referential theory of definite de-
scriptions, according to which definite descriptions without free individual
variables refer to individuals as do individual constants. We have shown
that lemma (L1) is a more formal equivalent of (A), for it states, to put it
simply, that
(L1′) if a certain singular sentence is true, then a certain individual con-
stant and a certain definite description refer to the same object (i.e.
an individual of the domain).
In (V1), which serves as the basis of our formalisation, it remains un-
defined of which type the referents of sentences are. However, if every
sentence is supposed to refer to one and only one object, then the question
arises as to how it is possible to extend—according to (V1)—the reference
function ref , which is only defined for descriptive constants, to a reference
function refM,g that is defined for all sentences of L PL1
=ι.
But what does Gödel’s argument tell us about the possible ways in
which such an extension could be defined? On the basis of the premises
of Gödel’s argument, Frege could argue that all true sentences refer to
the same object (and that all false sentences do so as well). Yet, what
is it—in addition to their truth-value—that all true and false sentences
of L PL1
=ι have in common in terms of semantics? It is merely the two
truth-values, and not a plethora of different states of affairs, that all true
and false sentences have in common and, thus, refer to. Hence, so long
as one adheres to the premises of Gödel’s argument, it is mandatory to
extend any reference function ref from descriptive constants to sentences
(and to formulas) in such a way that their referents relative to refM,g are
the two truth-values, and not a variety of different states of affairs. Thus,
a semantics such as that in (D11) would arise.
Gödel, however, considers his argument to be a reductio-ad-absurdum
of (A); in other words, he believes that this assumption (together with
the principle of compositionality) entails absurd consequences, viz. (FCG).
According to him, (A) should therefore be abandoned. Furthermore, since
(L1) is nothing but a more formal equivalent of (A), (L1) would also have
to be abandoned and, by extension, so too would any semantics, on the
basis of which this lemma can be proven.
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In what follows, Gödel’s preliminary draft of this argument will be
brought to a conclusion and thereby formalised using a calculus of natural
deduction for first-order predicate logic with identity. First, the argument
will be formalised for the case of true and, subsequently, for the case of
false singular sentences of L PL1
=ι. Next, the result will be generalised to
apply to all sentences of L PL1
=ι.
The question that we will examine in this context is as to whether the
premises of Gödel’s argument suffice to precisely determine the kind of the
entities referred to by the sentences of L PL1
=ι.
4.1 The Case of True Singular Sentences: (T4)
In addition to the premises (L1), (L2), (RT), (G), and (D14) the proof of
theorem (T4) requires the two following premises regarding the composition
of certain formulas of L PL1
=ι:
(Pr1) Res (pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q, pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q
(pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q//pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q))
(Pr2) Res (pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q, pb = ιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q
(pιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q//pιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q))
Let σ1, σ2 be arbitrary but fixed singular sentences of L PL1
=ι, let further
a be an individual constant of L PL1
=ι that occurs in σ1, and let b be an
individual constant of L PL1
=ι that occurs in σ2. Then, Gödel’s slingshot-
argument for the case of true singular sentences of L PL1
=ι is as follows:
(T4) {(L1), (L2), (RT), (G), (D14), (Pr1), (Pr2)} |−PL1=
(∀σ1, σ2, a, b,M, g)
(True (σ1[a], refM,g) & True (σ2[b], refM,g) ⇒ σ1[a] ≡refM,g σ2[b])
The proof of theorem (T4) requires an equivalence relation ≡refM,g (see
(D17)). Observe that the definition of coreferentiality (D17) is, by (D13)
and without the premises of Gödel’s argument, only applicable to singular
terms and n-ary predicate constants. It becomes applicable to sentences
once we assume the premises of Gödel’s argument, for these premises spec-
ify a number of conditions as to when two sentences are coreferential.
Let us first outline the main idea of the proof of this theorem, which
will be proven in the following three steps by Conditional Proof and, sub-
sequently, by Universal Generalisation:
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Step 1
The assumption for Conditional Proof states that
(1) True (σ1[a], refM,g) & True (σ2[b], refM,g).
Since
(2) LTrue (pa = b ∨ a , bq),
we have, by (D14),
(3) (∀M, g) True (pa = b ∨ a , bq, refM,g).
By (L2), (2) gives
(4) pa = b ∨ a , bq ≡refM,g pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q
and
(5) pa = b ∨ a , bq ≡refM,g pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q.
The singular sentence pa = b ∨ a , bq contains two individual constants, a
and b. Using our notation for singular sentences, this sentence can there-
fore be represented in two different ways, ‘σ[a]’ or ‘σ[b]’. In the first conse-
quence (4), σ[a] is the singular sentence pa = b∨ a , bq; thus, σ[a/v] is the
formula pv = b∨ v , bq. In the second consequence (5), σ[b] is the singular
sentence pa = b ∨ a , bq; thus, σ[b/v] is the formula pa = v ∨ a , vq. The
relationship between these two consequences can be illustrated as follows:
pa = b ∨ a , bq
≡refM,g ≡refM,g
pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q
This first step can be justified by (L2), into the proof of which (LR) has been
incorporated. Although (L2) is a consequence of (G), it is not necessary
to make use of the logically stronger postulate (G) itself. Instead, we can
justify this step by the logically weaker lemma (L2), which cannot be proven
using only the second semantics.
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Step 2
By (1) and (3), we have
(6) True (σ1[a], refM,g)
and
(7) True (pa = b ∨ a , bq, refM,g).
Hence, it follows from (6) and (7) by (L1) that
(8) a ≡refM,g pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q
and
(9) a ≡refM,g pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q.
From (8) and (9), we obtain by symmetry and transitivity of ≡refM,g
(10) pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q ≡refM,g pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q.
Furthermore, the identity sentence
(11) pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q
of L PL1
=ι is a result of partially substituting
(12) pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q
in
(13) pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q
with
(14) pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q.
As (10) gives
(15) pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q ≡refM,g pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q,
it follows from (11)–(15) by (RT) that
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(16) pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q ≡refM,g pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q.
On the other hand, it also follows from (1) and (3) that
(17) True (σ2[b], refM,g)
and
(18) True (pa = b ∨ a , bq, refM,g).
Similarly to (6)–(16), from (17) and (18), we also obtain by (L1) and (RT)
(19) pb = ιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q ≡refM,g pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q.
The illustration above can thus be continued in a similar vein:
pa = b ∨ a , bq
≡refM,g ≡refM,g
pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q
≡refM,g ≡refM,g
pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q pb = ιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q
This second step can be justified by (L1) and (RT), the former being prov-
able by (T1) and by the reference-theoretical clause for identity. At this
point, we incorporate the critical assumption (A) since (L1) is a more formal
equivalent of (A). Furthermore, we also have to make use of the principle
of compositionality (R)—or rather its specification (RT) for closed singular
terms.
Step 3
By (G), we have
(20) σ1[a] ≡refM,g pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q
and
(21) σ2[b] ≡refM,g pb = ιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q.
Thus, it follows from (4), (16), (20); (5), (19), and (21) by the transitivity
of ≡refM,g that
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(22) σ1[a] ≡refM,g σ2[b].
This completes the Conditional Proof. UG. 
Even if we combine the assumptions that σ1[a] and σ2[b] are true rela-
tive to refM,g—which would imply the satisfiability of σ1[a] and σ2[b]—with
(NT), (D15), and (LR), we cannot justify this third step. The reasons for
this have already been discussed in §3.1.4; accordingly, (NT) is refutable in
the second semantics, which is why postulate (G) is of paramount impor-
tance here.
Synopsis
The three steps can be illustrated in the following way:
pa = b ∨ a , bq
≡refM,g ≡refM,g
pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q
≡refM,g ≡refM,g




1. (∀σ, c, v,M, g) (True (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒
c ≡refM,g pιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q
(L1)
2. (∀σ, c, v,M, g) (LTrue (σ[c]) ⇒
σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q)
(L2)
3. (∀S 1, S 2, t1, t2,M, g)
(Res (S 2, S 1(t1//t2)) & t1 ≡refM,g t2 ⇒
S 1 ≡refM,g S 2)
(RT)
4. (∀σ, c, v,M, g)
σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q
(G)
5. LTrue (pa = b ∨ a , bq) Metatheorem
6. (∀ref ,M, g) True (pa = b ∨ a , bq, refM,g) (D14) 5
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7. Res (pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q,
pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q (pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q//
pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q))
(Pr1)
8. Res (pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q,
pb = ιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q (pιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q//
pιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q))
(Pr2)
9. True (σ1[a], refM,g) & True (σ2[b], refM,g) Ass. f. CP
10. True (σ1[a], refM,g) SIM 9
11. True (σ2[b], refM,g) SIM 9
12. σ1[a] ≡refM,g pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q UI 4
13. σ2[b] ≡refM,g pb = ιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q UI 4
14. a ≡refM,g pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q MP 10, UI 1
15. b ≡refM,g pιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q MP 11, UI 1
16. True (pa = b ∨ a , bq, refM,g) UI 6
17. pa = b ∨ a , bq ≡refM,g
pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q
MP 5, UI 2
18. a ≡refM,g pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q MP 16, UI 1
19. pιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q ≡refM,g
pιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q
(Tr) (Sy) 14, 18
20. pa = ιv (σ1[a/v] ∧ v = a)q ≡refM,g
pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q
MP ADJ 7, 19,
UI 3
21. σ1[a] ≡refM,g pa = ιv ((v = b ∨ v , b) ∧ v = a)q (Tr) 12, 20
22. σ1[a] ≡refM,g pa = b ∨ a , bq (Tr) 21, (Sy) 17
23. pa = b ∨ a , bq ≡refM,g
pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q
MP 5, UI 2
24. b ≡refM,g pιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q MP 16, UI 1
25. pιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q ≡refM,g
pιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q
(Tr) (Sy) 15, 24
26. pb = ιv (σ2[b/v] ∧ v = b)q ≡refM,g
pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q
MP ADJ 8, 25,
UI 3
27. σ2[b] ≡refM,g pb = ιv ((a = v ∨ a , v) ∧ v = b)q (Tr) 13, 26
28. σ2[b] ≡refM,g pa = b ∨ a , bq (Tr) 27, (Sy) 23
31
29. σ1[a] ≡refM,g σ2[b] (Tr) 22, (Sy) 28
30. True (σ1[a], refM,g) & True (σ2[b], refM,g) ⇒
σ1[a] ≡refM,g σ2[b]
CP 9–29
31. (∀σ1, σ2, a, b,M, g)
(True (σ1[a], refM,g) & True (σ2[b], refM,g) ⇒
σ1[a] ≡refM,g σ2[b])
UG 30
Thus, it follows from the premises (L1), (L2), (RT), (G), (D14), (Pr1), and
(Pr2) that all true singular sentences of L PL1
=ι refer to the same object.

4.2 The Case of False Singular Sentences: (T5)
To prove the following theorem for the case of false singular sentences, we
need—in addition to the premises (LR), (T4), (N), and (RS)—a premise
which states that
(Pr3) Res (p¬¬σ4[b]q, p¬¬σ3[a]q (p¬σ3[a]q//p¬σ4[b]q)).
Gödel’s slingshot-argument for the case of false singular sentences of
L PL1
=ι is as follows:
(T5) {(LR), (T4), (N), (RS), (Pr3)} |−PL1=
(∀σ3, σ4, a, b,M, g)
(False (σ3[a], refM,g) & False (σ4[b], refM,g) ⇒ σ3[a] ≡refM,g σ4[b])
The proof of theorem (T5) requires once again the equivalence relation
≡refM,g.
Proof of (T5):
1. (∀S 1, S 2,M, g) (LE (S 1, S 2) ⇒ S 1 ≡refM,g S 2) (LR)
2. (∀σ1, σ2, a, b,M, g)
(True (σ1[a], refM,g) & True (σ2[b], refM,g) ⇒
σ1[a] ≡refM,g σ2[b])
(T4)
3. (∀σ, c,M, g)
(False (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒ True (p¬σ[c]q, refM,g)
(N)
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4. (∀S 1, S 2,T1,T2,M, g)
(Res (S 2, S 1(T1//T2)) & T1 ≡refM,g T2 ⇒
S 1 ≡refM,g S 2)
(RS)
5. Res (p¬¬σ4[b]q, p¬¬σ3[a]q (p¬σ3[a]q//p¬σ4[b]q)) (Pr3)
6. False (σ3[a], refM,g) & False (σ4[b], refM,g) Ass. f. CP
7. False (σ3[a], refM,g) SIM 6
8. False (σ4[b], refM,g) SIM 6
9. True (p¬σ3[a]q, refM,g) MP 7, UI 3
10. True (p¬σ4[b]q, refM,g) MP 8, UI 3
11. p¬σ3[a]q ≡refM,g p¬σ4[b]q MP ADJ 9, 10,
UI 2
12. p¬¬σ3[a]q ≡refM,g p¬¬σ4[b]q MP ADJ 5, 11,
UI 4
13. LE (p¬¬σ3[a]q, σ3[a]) Metatheorem
14. p¬¬σ3[a]q ≡refM,g σ3[a] MP 13, UI 1
15. LE (p¬¬σ4[b]q, σ4[b]) Metatheorem
16. p¬¬σ4[b]q ≡refM,g σ4[b] MP 15, UI 1
17. σ3[a] ≡refM,g σ4[b] (Tr) (Sy) 14,
12, 16
18. False (σ3[a], refM,g) & False (σ4[b], refM,g) ⇒
σ3[a] ≡refM,g σ4[b]
CP 6–17
19. (∀σ3, σ4, a, b,M, g)
(False (σ3[a], refM,g) & False (σ4[b], refM,g) ⇒
σ3[a] ≡refM,g σ4[b])
UG 18
Thus, it follows from the premises (LR), (T4), (N), (RS), and (Pr3) that all
false singular sentences of L PL1
=ι refer to the same object. By the theorems
(T4) and (T5), we arrive at the conclusion that all true singular sentences
of L PL1





The conclusion that we reached in the proofs of theorems (T4) and (T5)
will now be generalised to apply not only to singular sentences, but rather
to all sentences of L PL1
=ι. The fact of the matter is that any arbitrary non-
singular sentence S is logically equivalent to a singular sentence such as pS∧
c = cq. From (LR), which states that logically equivalent sentences refer to
the same object, it follows that any arbitrary non-singular sentence S refers
to the same object as a singular sentence σ that is logically equivalent to S .
Thus, two true non-singular sentences S 1 and S 2 refer to the same objects
as two singular sentences σ1 and σ2 that are logically equivalent to S 1 and
S 2, respectively. But these two singular sentences, σ1 and σ2, are both true
since they are logically equivalent to the two true non-singular sentences S 1
and S 2, respectively. From (T4), it therefore follows that σ1 and σ2 refer to
the same object. Furthermore, since the two true non-singular sentences S 1
and S 2 refer to the same objects as σ1 and σ2, respectively, and since the
latter two refer to the same object, the sentences S 1 and S 2 must also refer
to the same object. Therefore, all true non-singular sentences refer to the
same object; the same holds true of all false non-singular sentences. But by
theorems (T4) and (T5), we have already established that all true singular
sentences refer to the same object and that all false singular sentences do so
as well. Furthermore, all true singular sentences and all true non-singular
sentences together amount to all true sentences, and the same applies to
false sentences. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that all true sentences
of L PL1
=ι refer to the same object, and so do all false sentences of L PL1
=ι.
This conclusion is precisely the (FCG)-thesis. 
In his outline of this proof, Gödel fails to include a number of premises
that are necessary for deriving the (FCG)-thesis from the set of premises
of his argument, e.g. (LR) and (G). If we now add the missing premises, all
the premises of Gödel’s slingshot-argument together become sufficient to
restrict the set of all entities referred to by all true and all false sentences of
L PL1
=ι to a set containing at most two different elements (e.g. at most two
different truth-values or at most two different states of affairs). However, it
remains uncertain as to how these premises could be used to derive Frege’s
assumption (which states that truth-values are the referents of sentences)
from the (FCG)-thesis. Therefore, Gödel’s argument provides no informa-
tion as to the kind of these entities. The members of any set that contains
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at most two different elements are possible candidates for the referents of
the sentences of L PL1
=ι relative to refM,g.
In sum, we have shown that the premises of Gödel’s slingshot-argument
only permit conclusions to be drawn as to the number of referents, but
they do not suffice to precisely determine the kind of these referents.
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5 Summary
If we add the missing premises of Gödel’s argument, then the set of premises
of this argument contains—amongst others—the following premises:
(A) Definite descriptions without free individual variables refer to in-
dividuals as do individual constants.
(LR) Logically equivalent sentences refer to the same object.
(RT) It is always possible to substitute coreferential closed singular
terms for each other within any sentence without changing its
referent.
(RS) It is always possible to substitute coreferential sentences for each
other within any sentence without changing its referent.
The premises (LR), (RT), and (RS) are neutral reference-theoretical prin-
ciples since it cannot be inferred from them of which kind the referents of
sentences are.
The set of premises of Gödel’s argument, however, does not contain the
following non-neutral reference-theoretical principles:
(T) Truth-values are the referents of sentences.
(TRT) It is always possible to substitute coreferential closed singular terms
for each other within any sentence without changing its truth-
value as referent.
(TRS) It is always possible to substitute coreferential sentences for each
other within any sentence without changing its truth-value as ref-
erent.
This has to be the case, lest his argument become trivial. For instance,
it would easily follow from (TRT) that truth-values are the referents of
sentences. Such a trivialisation, however, could not have been a part of
Gödel’s intention.
Instead, it is his aim to justify—by (A), (LR), (RT), (RS), and by the
remaining premises of his argument—the thesis that
(FCG) all true sentences refer to the same object, and so do all false
sentences (i.e. the Frege-Church-Gödel-thesis).
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Furthermore, the (FCG)-thesis can support Frege’s thesis (T), which states
that truth-values are the referents of sentences. Nevertheless, (FCG) is not
sufficient for proving (T) in a strictly logical way. For, as we have shown,
the premises of Gödel’s argument are not sufficient for determining the
kind of the referents of sentences. They merely show that the elements of
any set with at most two members are possible candidates for the referents
of sentences. These members can (but need not) be the two truth-values—
True and False.
Gödel considers (FCG) to be absurd as it rules out the possibility that
different sentences may refer to different objects. According to him, it is
necessary to abandon one of the premises on which this thesis is based.
Thus, he proposes that the fundamental assumption (A) of a referential
theory of definite descriptions be abandoned. This assumption states that
definite descriptions without free individual variables refer to individuals
as do individual constants. Therefore, he proposes a non-referential theory
of definite descriptions—such as Russell’s theory—while maintaining the
principle of compositionality (R).
From the point of view of a state-of-affairs semantics, however, there
is a third possibility: we maintain (A) and (R), and instead we choose to
abandon a different premise of Gödel’s argument; specifically, the premise
that logically equivalent sentences refer to the same object. In the context
of a state-of-affairs semantics, it can be shown that logically equivalent
sentences that are not identical refer to different states of affairs because
they involve different objects, and because they have different necessary
and sufficient conditions for obtaining. For instance, the state-of-affairs
that Mars is a thing such that it rotates and exists is different from the
state of affairs that Mars rotates and that Mars exists. While the first state
of affairs does not involve any sub-state-of-affairs, the second state of affairs
involves two sub-states-of-affairs. While the condition for obtaining of the
first state of affairs is the condition that Mars is an element of the set of
all things that rotate and exist, the condition for obtaining of the second
state of affairs is the condition that the two sub-states-of-affairs obtain.
Thus, the two states of affairs are different, even though the two sentences
describing them are logically equivalent to each other.
By this approach, it becomes necessary to define in (D13) an extension
refM,g of ref to the sentences (and formulas) of L PL1
=ι such that logically
equivalent sentences (as well as sentences that are of the same form as the
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two sentences in (G)) refer to and describe different states of affairs. Any
state-of-affairs semantics that is based on (A) and (R) such that different
sentences may refer to different states of affairs has to satisfy this condition,
lest it fall victim to the slingshot-argument.
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6 Appendix: Proofs of the Metatheorems and
Lemmata
6.1 Proof of (T1)
Let σ, c,M = 〈D, ref , d◦〉, and g be chosen freely, and let v be an individual
variable that does not occur in σ[c]. Suppose, by CP,
(1) True (σ[c], refM,g).
From this we have
(2) (∃g) True (σ[c], refM,g).
Since σ[c] is a singular sentence, it does not contain any free occurrences
of individual variables. The truth of σ[c] relative to refM,g is therefore
independent of the variable assignment g. This is owing to
(3) (∃g) True (σ[c], refM,g)⇔ (∀g) True (σ[c], refM,g),
which holds for all (singular) sentences18. Thus from (2), it follows by (3)
that
(4) (∀g) True (σ[c], refM,g).
Now let g[v|ref (c)] be a variable assignment from IVL PL1= ι to D as specified
by (D9). Then, (4) gives
(5) True (σ[c], refM,g[v|ref (c)]).
Let us next show that there exists (6) at least one and (7) at most one
d ∈ D such that True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d]) where d = ref (c).
ad (6) It holds that
(6.1) refM,g[v|ref (c)](v) =(D13b) g[v|ref (c)](v) =(D9) ref (c) =(D13a)
refM,g (c) = refM,g[v|ref (c)](c).
18 Cf. (Gamut 1991, p.97 f.).
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The functions refM,g (c) and refM,g[v|ref (c)](c) are identical because c does not
contain any individual constants since for all g, g∗: refM,g (c) = refM,g∗(c).
From (6.1), we have
(6.2) refM,g[v|ref (c)](v) = refM,g[v|ref (c)](c).
By (D13f), it follows from (6.2) that
(6.3) True (pv = cq, refM,g[v|ref (c)]).
The formula σ[c/v] is the result of replacing all occurrences of c in σ[c]
with v (the variable v being an individual variable that does not occur in
σ[c]). The only difference between σ[c/v] and σ[c] is that σ[c/v] contains
free occurrences of v in every place where c occurs in σ[c]. From (6.3),
True (pv = cq, refM,g[v|ref (c)]), and from (5), True (σ[c], refM,g[v|ref (c)]), by Leibniz’
Law and semantic ascent, we obtain
(6.4) True (σ[c/v], refM,g[v|ref (c)]).
From (6.4) and (6.3), we conclude by (D13h) that
(6.5) True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|ref (c)]) & ref (c) = ref (c).
Hence, by EG we have
(6.6) (∃d) (d ∈ D & True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d]) & d = ref (c)),
i.e. there is at least one d ∈ D such that True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d])
where d = ref (c).
ad (7) We next show that for all d′, d′′∈D it holds that if True (pσ[c/v]∧v =
cq, refM,g[v|d′]) and True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d′′]), then d′ = d′′. Suppose,
by CP,
(7.1) True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d′]) &
True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d′′]),
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which gives
(7.2) True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d′])
(7.3) True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d′′]).
By (D13h) and (D13f), it follows from (7.2) and (7.3) that
(7.4) refM,g[v|d′](v) = refM,g[v|d′](c)
(7.5) refM,g[v|d′′](v) = refM,g[v|d′′](c),
which leads to
(7.6) d′ =(D9) g[v|d′](v) =(D13b) refM,g[v|d′](v) =(7.4) refM,g[v|d′](c) =
refM,g (c) =(D13a) ref (c) =(D13a) refM,g (c) = refM,g[v|d′′](c) =(7.5)
refM,g[v|d′′](v) =(D13b) g[v|d′′](v) =(D9) d′′.
We suppose again that for all g, g∗: refM,g (c) = refM,g∗ (c). Hence,
(7.7) d′ = d′′.
By CP and UG, (7.1) to (7.7) give
(7.8) (∀d′, d′′) (d′, d′′∈ D & True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d′]) &
True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d′′]) ⇒ d′ = d′′),
i.e. there is at most one d ∈ D such that True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, refM,g[v|d]).
Thus, (6.6) and (7.8) lead to
(8) (∃!d) (d ∈ D & True (pσ[c/v] ∧ v = cq, ref M,g[v|d]) & d = ref (c)).
Hence, by (D13d),
(9) refM,g (pιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q) = ref (c) =(D13a) refM,g (c).
Owing to the symmetry of identity, (9) shows by (D13f) that
(10) True (pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g).
By CP, (1) to (10) yield
(11) True (σ[c], refM,g)⇒ True (pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g).
Finally, we apply UG to (11), which gives theorem (T1). 
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6.2 Proof of (T2)
Choose σ, c,M = 〈D, ref , d◦〉, g arbitrarily. Let v be an individual variable
which does not occur in σ[c]. Suppose, by CP,
(1) True (σ[c], refM,g)
By (T1), we have
(2) True (σ[c], refM,g)⇒ True (pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g).
From (1) and (2), it follows by propositional logic that
(3) (True (σ[c], refM,g) & True (pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g)) g
(False (σ[c], refM,g) & False (pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g)).
Hence, by (D13k),
(4) True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g).
From (1)–(4) we obtain, by CP,
(5) True (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒
True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g).
By UG, (5) gives theorem (T2). 
6.3 Proof of the refutability of (NT)
Suppose
(1) Satisfiable (pFcq),
that is, there are at least one M′ = 〈D′, ref ′, d◦′〉 and one g′ such that
(2) True (pFcq, ref ′M′,g′).
The next step is to show that
(3) ∼LTrue (pFc↔ c = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q).
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The atomic sentence pFcq is not logically true; therefore, there are at least
one more M and one more g such that
(4) False (pFcq, refM,g).
As an example, consider the following reference-theoretical model for L PL1
=ι
(where the metalinguistic symbol ‘∅’ denotes the empty set):
(5) M′′ = 〈{0}, ref ′′, 0〉,
with d◦ = 0 & ref ′′(c) = 0 & ref ′′(F) = ∅
The claim (3) can be justified as follows: from
(6) ref ′′M′′,g′′(F) = ref ′′(F) = ∅
and
(7) ref ′′M′′,g′′(c) = ref ′′(c) = 0
we have, by (D13e),
(8) False (pFcq, ref ′′M′′,g′′)
since 〈ref ′′M′′,g′′(c)〉 < ref ′′M′′,g′′(F). On the other hand, it follows from (6) that
there is not at least one, nor, consequently, one and only one d ∈ D such
that True (pFv ∧ v = cq, ref ′′M′′,g′′[v|d]). Thus, by (D13d),
(9) ref ′′M′′,g′′(pιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q) = 0.
By the laws of identity, (7) and (9) yield
(10) ref ′′M′′,g′′(c) = ref ′′M′′,g′′(pιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q).
Hence, by (D13f),
(11) True (pc = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q, ref ′′M′′,g′′).
From (8) and (11), it follows by (D13k) that
(12) False (pFc↔ c = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q ref ′′M′′,g′′).
Hence, pFc ↔ c = ιv (Fv ∧ v = c)q is not logically true. Accordingly, the
two parts of the biconditional are not logically equivalent to each other.
Consequently, the metatheoretical sentence (INT) is false; therefore, (NT)
is false as well and thus refutable. 
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6.4 Proof of Lemma (L2)
1. (∀σ, c, v,M, g) (True (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒
True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g))
(T2)
2. (∀S 1, S 2,M, g) (LE (S 1, S 2) ⇒ S 1 ≡refM,g S 2) (LR)
3. LTrue (σ[c]) Ass. f. CP
4. (∀M, g) True (σ[c], refM,g) (D14) 3
5. (∀M, g) (True (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒
True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g))
UI 1
6. (∀M, g) (True (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒
True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g)) ⇒
((∀M, g) True (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒ (∀M, g)
True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g))
PL1-theorem
7. (∀M, g) True (σ[c], refM,g) ⇒ (∀M, g)
True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g)
MP 5, 6
8. (∀M, g)
True (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q, refM,g)
MP 4, 7
9. LTrue (pσ[c]↔ c = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q) (D14) 8
10. LE (σ[c], pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q) (D15) 9
11. σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q MP 10, UI 2
12. LTrue (σ[c]) ⇒ σ[c] ≡refM,g pc = ιv (σ[c/v] ∧ v = c)q CP 3–11
13. (∀σ, c, v,M, g) (LTrue (σ[c]) ⇒
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